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How certain is ‘certain’? Exploring how the English-language media reported the use of 
calibrated language in the IPCC’s Fifth Assessment Report 
 
Abstract 
This article presents findings from an analysis of English-language media reports following the 
publication of the fifth Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Assessment Report in 
September 2013. Focusing on the way they reported the IPCC’s use of ‘calibrated’ language, we find 
that of 1906 articles relating to the issuing of the report only 272 articles (14.27%) convey the use of a 
deliberate and systematic verbal scale. The IPCC’s carefully calibrated language was rarely 
discussed or explicated, but in some instances scientists, political actors or journalists would attempt 
to contextualize or elaborate on the reported findings by using analogies to other scientific principles 
or examples of taking action despite uncertainty. We consider those analogies in terms of their 
efficacy in communicating (un)certainty. 
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Introduction 
Conveying scientifically assessed risks, uncertainties and certainties is a major challenge to science 
communication, especially in the context of climate change. It has become clear that scientists, 
politicians, journalists and the general public use and understand the words ‘risk’ and ‘uncertainty’ in 
very different ways (Budescu et al., 2009; Campbell, 2011; Erkwurzel, et al., 2011; Harris et al., 
2013), which can lead to miscommunication and misunderstanding. Contrasting what some call 
‘school science’ (where students are taught solid facts) and ‘research science’ (which explicitly 
acknowledges uncertainty as inherent to and as an incitement for more work), Painter (2013) refers to 
the former as a model which leads many members of the public to understand ‘uncertain’ as 
‘incomplete’ or as an admission of ignorance. Put simply, climate scientists associate the word 
uncertainty with ‘probability, confidence intervals and margins of error’ (Corner, 2014) while members 
of the public may associate it with ignorance, doubt and anxiety (Nerlich, 2012).  
There is also a growing gap between increasing scientific certainty regarding climate change 
(including a growing knowledge about uncertainties) and public perception of uncertainty in the sense 
of an overall deficiency in scientific knowledge about climate change. As Patt and Weber (2013: 259) 
report: 
 
Public opinion polls reveal that the perception of climate change as an uncertain phenomenon 
is increasing, even as consensus has increased within the scientific community of its reality 
and its attribution to human causes. At the same time, the scientific community has sought to 
improve its communication practices, in order to present a more accurate picture to the public 
and policy makers of the state of scientific knowledge about climate change. 
 
“Moreover, climate communication faces new challenges as assessments of climate-related changes 
confront uncertainty more explicitly and adopt risk-based approaches to evaluating impacts.” (Pidgeon 
& Fischhoff, 2011: 35). Academics have strived to offer a theoretical distinction between ‘risk’ and 
‘uncertainty’ for nearly a century (Knight, 1921; Leroy & Singell Jr., 1987) and the terms are 
understood differently across disciplines. Our intention is not to resolve this theoretical distinction, but 
to observe how ‘uncertainty’ has been articulated in relation to climate change discourse and how the 
concept of ‘risk’ is used in relation to climate change mitigation. As such, we discuss ‘uncertainty’ in 
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relation to unknown outcomes and ‘risk’ in relation to action that has some sense of foreseeable 
outcome.     
In a context where climate scientists are increasingly open, explicit and transparent about 
scientific uncertainty and in a context where, at the same time, uncertainty in a different sense is used 
to challenge climate science, it is important to understand how efforts to communicate uncertainty 
play out at the interface between climate science and the public sphere.  
Over the last twenty years or so a growing body of literature has examined the 
communication of climate change in the mass media (Boykoff, 2011). Many articles have focused on 
the communication of risk in this context (Carvalho and Burgess, 2005; Sterman, 2011), others have 
examined media representations of uncertainty (Zehr, 2000; Whitmarsh, 2011; Poortinga et al., 2011; 
Corner, 2014), but only a few have tried to understand the communication of scientific uncertainty or 
probabilistic information in the context of climate change (Patt & Dessai, 2005; Stephens et al., 2012)  
and none so far have attempted to examine how this plays out in the mass media.  
We examine the most recent IPCC Assessment Report published in September 2013, more 
precisely the Fifth Assessment (AR5) report entitled ‘Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science 
Basis, Summary for Policy Makers (SPM)’, as a case for studying how uncertainty language is used 
(or not) in the press. This is an important case study, as since 2007 all IPCC reports have adopted a 
‘calibrated language’ approach to communicating scientific uncertainty in order to, in a sense, “reduce 
doubt about uncertainty” (Moss, 2011). This calibrated language is based on verbally paraphrasing 
numerical degrees of ‘certainty’, ‘confidence’ and ‘likelihood’. 
The work on calibrated language within the IPCC reports is largely for the benefit of the 
authors themselves and the policymakers for whom the report is written. Within the report authors 
follow these now settled guidelines on how to represent uncertainty very closely, with varying degrees 
of success (see Harris et al., 2013). However, for the majority of the public – and for many politicians 
– the findings of the IPCC reports will be accessed through media reporting. Given that so much 
attention has been paid to the careful use of terms in relation to degrees of ‘certainty’, ‘confidence’ 
and ‘likelihood’ in the findings of AR5, this article considers whether this effort is reflected in the 
media. If it is not, we question the value of such efforts and consider the limitations of these efforts for 
communicating scientific uncertainty to mass audiences. We show that in the mass media, journalists 
often use alternative ways of presenting the same messages, specifically through the use of analogy. 
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We consider the effects of this additional representation of the IPCC’s findings and whether such 
strategies could be used to supplement the IPCC’s own reports. 
We focus on news items in English speaking countries, such as the UK, the United States, 
Australia, Canada, and so on. However, we do not home in on any country in particular. Some studies 
are beginning to carry out such research into the interpretation of the IPCC’s calibrated language in 
different languages and cultures (Harris et al., 2013), while others are starting to explore media 
representations of calibrated uncertainty language in specific countries, such as India (see for 
example: Kahn, 2014) and we hope that more such studies will follow. 
 
Background 
Creating a calibrated language 
The IPCC publishes special reports on climate change which have the agreement of leading climate 
scientists and the consensus of participating governments. The first report was published in 1988 with 
subsequent reports appearing in 1995; 2001; 2007; and the first instalment of the Fifth Assessment 
Report in 2013. Subsequent chapters on impacts and mitigation were released on 31st March 2014 
(WG2) and 13th April 2014 (WG3) (http://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar5/#.UxyJa1Pz0-Y). A year before the 
third IPCC report two climate scientists, Moss and Schneider (2000), recommended a seven-step 
approach for describing uncertainty based on their observations of a lack of consistent criteria for 
assigning probabilities and characterizing levels of confidence in the Second Assessment Report  
(Moss & Schneider, 1997). Their recommendations included the use of specific qualitative language 
in conveying uncertainty in these reports so that the general public and policy makers may 
understand them better. 
The Guidance Note for Lead Authors of the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report on Addressing 
Uncertainties provides a detailed description of how uncertainty is treated in IPCC reports 
(Mastrandrea et al., 2010): 
Where uncertainty is assessed qualitatively, it is characterised by providing a relative sense 
of the amount and quality of evidence (that is, information from theory, observations or 
models indicating whether a belief or proposition is true or valid) and the degree of 
agreement (that is, the level of concurrence in the literature on a particular finding). This 
approach is used by WG III through a series of self-explanatory terms such as: high 
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agreement, much evidence; high agreement, medium evidence; medium agreement, medium 
evidence; etc.  
Where uncertainty is assessed more quantitatively using expert judgement of the 
correctness of underlying data, models or analyses, then the following scale of confidence 
levels is used to express the assessed chance of a finding being correct: very high 
confidence at least 9 out of 10; high confidence about 8 out of 10; medium confidence about 5 
out of 10; low confidence about 2 out of 10; and very low confidence less than 1 out of 10.  
Where uncertainty in specific outcomes is assessed using expert judgment and statistical 
analysis of a body of evidence (e.g. observations or model results), then the following 
likelihood ranges are used to express the assessed probability of occurrence: virtually 
certain >99%; extremely likely >95%; very likely >90%; likely >66%; more likely than not > 
50%; about as likely as not 33% to 66%; unlikely <33%; very unlikely <10%; extremely 
unlikely <5%; exceptionally unlikely <1% [emphasis added]. 
 
In recent years some scholars have studied the usefulness and effectiveness of this 
calibrated language (Budescu et al, 2009, 2012) and one study has come to the conclusion that ‘while 
it is possible to develop a vocabulary that conveys the intention of the IPCC, the recipient of the 
communication is likely to belong to another practice community and, thus not use the terminology as 
intended’ (Landström et al., 2015). One such practice community is that of mass media journalists. 
 
Reporting the calibrated language of the IPCC 
The first line of the main body of the AR5 press release reads: ‘It is extremely likely that 
human influence has been the dominant cause of the observed warming since the mid-20th century’ 
(http://www.ipcc.ch/news_and_events/docs/ar5/press_release_ar5_wgi_en.pdf). However, it is not 
until the closing paragraph that the document explains the deliberate and specific use of a term such 
as ‘extremely likely’. Previous research has found that media reporting of the IPCC has neglected the 
use of calibrated language. Painter (2013) reports that although 44% of articles reporting on three 
IPCC reports across six different countries incorporated the concepts ‘confidence’ and ‘likelihood’,  
only 27 of 177 (15%) included an explanation of what they meant. Of those published in the U.K., 
‘[t]he IPCC concepts of likelihood and probability were present in 13 of the 29 articles, but in only two 
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of them were the concepts explained’ (Painter, 2013: 122). Kahn (2014: 24) found that ‘the English-
Indian print-press does not utilize the technical terminology employed by the IPCC’ and that ‘The 
majority of articles using this language did so in providing direct quotes from the report and most were 
quantitative measures.’ Bailey et al. (2014) reported an increase in the use of numerical ranges and 
the adjective ‘likely’ in the U.S. media coverage of climate issues, suggesting that the IPCC’s 
calibrated language had been appropriated by the media. However they also observed a sustained 
use of mitigating terms that hedged any claims of scientific certainty. 
 
Conceptual background 
As Boykoff has pointed out, “[m]edia representations of climate issues – from news to 
entertainment – are powerful and important links between people's everyday realities and 
experiences, and the ways in which they are discussed by scientists, policymakers and public actors.” 
(Boykoff, 2011: front matter). Public perceptions of climate change are shaped by media 
representations and public perceptions in turn influence policy making. Both the mass media and 
institutions like the IPCC play a crucial role in the ‘cultural circuit’ of climate change communication 
(Carvalho & Burgess, 2005). The purpose of the IPCC is to “provide rigorous and balanced scientific 
information to decision makers” and to the general public alike; while the mass media report on this 
regularly delivered scientific information and, in a sense, digest it for public consumption.  
Gamson noted in 1999, that influential scientific institutions such as the IPCC can be seen as 
‘primary’ validators of science, while influential media institutions, such as prestigious broadsheets for 
example, can be seen as ‘secondary validators’ (Gamson, 1999: 23-24; see also Kahn, 2014: 6). Both 
are involved in framing scientific information and making it available to policy makers and the general 
public. Such framing has, since 2007, been supported by the creation of a calibrated language 
through which the IPCC attempts to convey scientific and probabilistic information in everyday 
language. Both institutions, the IPCC and the mass media are, as Carvalho has pointed out 
“authorized ‘agents of definition’ of science matters” (Carvalho, 2007: 223). However, while the IPCC, 
as an organization at the interface between science and policy, uses numbers and a calibrated 
language, the mass media, as well as those who talk to the mass media, tend to use stories and 
figures of speech that make the unknown and unfamiliar accessible to their readers and audiences. 
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 Humans rely on metaphor, comparison and analogy to develop understanding of relatively 
unfamiliar concepts by likening them to more familiar concepts. Burton-Jeangros et al. (2013) found 
that pregnant women would translate the risks they came across in prenatal screening, understanding 
a risk of 1-in-30 of chromosomal abnormality to be like having one in a classroom of children, or a 
probability of 1 in 7000 as one piece in a jigsaw. Researchers have examined the way that politicians 
use metaphorical tools to incite action in that ‘[a]nalogy may be a powerful way of mapping emotional 
connotations on to previously neutral objects and events’ (Blanchette & Dunbar, 2001: 735). 
Analogies are chosen for their comparable features, but they are extricated from their origin and 
located in an unfamiliar domain, so inevitably there will be aspects that are incongruous with the new 
context. Put simply, ‘metaphors also involve a potential trade-off between the creation of greater 
understanding and the risk of dangerous misappropriation’ (Reisfield & Wilson, 2004: 4026). Kueffer 
and Larson (2014: 722) offer the following criteria in assessing the appropriateness of metaphors for 
science communication: factual correctness; socially acceptable language; neutrality; and 
transparency. This highlights the importance of considering the accuracy; potential offence; use of 
emotive language or rhetoric; and making explicit when metaphorical or analogous language is being 
used. The use of similes in place of metaphor, using an ‘X is like Y’ statement, has been shown to 
decrease the risk that assertions will be taken literally (Carolan, 2006). In addition to the use of 
calibrated language and associated numerical scales, we therefore examine the use of analogy in 
reporting the findings of AR5 and consider their efficacy in conveying (un)certainty. If calibrated 
language does not ‘work’ in media settings while analogical language does (within limits), this might 
provide some indications for the IPCC of where to look for better communication tools in the future. 
 
Methods and data 
A search was conducted through Nexis® for English-language publications using the terms ‘IPCC’ or 
‘Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’, excluding articles referring to the Independent Policy 
Complaints Commission (IPCC). This search covered the timeframe between Saturday 21st 
September 2013 and Friday 4th October 2013 to accommodate the news pieces published in the week 
preceding and the week following the official release of the IPCC AR5 on Friday 27th September 2013. 
Details of the report were available online as early as December 2012 
(http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2012/dec/14/ipcc-climate-change-report-leaked-online) and 
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in the days leading up to the official release, the media were reporting on the ‘headline’ findings of the 
report, hence the inclusion of those days’ publications in our search. 
 A total of 1906 news items amounting to 1,965,396 words were collected across this 14-day 
period. These news items were tagged for their use of terms relating to the calibrated language of the 
IPCC report and uncertainty. This included: 
 certain/certainty/certainties 
 uncertain/uncertainty/uncertainties 
 probably/probability/probabilities 
 likely/likelihood/unlikely 
 confidence. 
Since we were primarily concerned with the use of the IPCC’s calibrated language those articles 
which did not contain both ‘IPCC/Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’ and at least one of the 
certainty terms were removed. Thus our search would only identify the use of alternative phraseology 
such as ‘a 66% chance’ if it was used in addition to the use of the specified terms. Of the original 
1906 articles, 1330 articles (69.8%) included both the ‘IPCC’ and at least one of these ‘certainty’ 
terms. However, a number of publications operated as summary reports of the various news items of 
the day so in many instances, issues of certainty were not discussed in relation to the report but in 
relation to some other news event. Furthermore, ‘certain’ is often used to mean ‘particular, specific’ 
and therefore not relevant to the purpose of this inquiry. As such, 407 articles were removed because 
of this irrelevance, leaving 923 publications that reported on issues of ‘certainty’ in relation to the 
IPCC report. 
The use of analogy as a form of metaphorical language was identified manually through a 
close reading of the sample and as such, only accounted for the use of analogy when there was also 
reference to the IPCC’s calibrated language. At this stage, we were concerned only with the explicit 
use of comparative reports of scientific certainty, such as ‘[The IPCC] is now as sure that human 
beings are causing climate change – 95 per cent – as that cigarettes cause cancer’. Such a construct 
is consistent with Kueffer and Larson’s (2014) criterion of ‘transparency’ and therefore understood to 
be an attempt to provide clarification of the findings of AR5. This approach did not account for the use 
of more embedded metaphors, which have been shown to be prominent in climate change discourse 
(Nerlich et al., 2010), nor did it account for the use of analogous terms in lieu of reference to the 
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IPCC’s calibrated language. Nevertheless, in examining this relatively transparent type of construct 
we can critically examine the effect of analogy in offering further clarification of scientific (un)certainty.  
 
Findings 
Use of the IPCC’s calibrated language 
The purpose of this research was to determine whether the news reports of the release of AR5 made 
reference to or acknowledged the use of the calibrated language in relation to (un)certainty. Those 
remaining 923 articles were read closely to examine how the certainty reported by the IPCC, in the 
terms ‘extremely likely’ and the corresponding figure of >95% certainty for example, were represented 
as existing on a clearly defined scale. Of 923 articles, 225 (11.80% of the original ‘IPCC’ search; 
24.38% of the sample) were deemed to have made implicit reference to the existence of a 
quantifiable scale. This included:  
 references to a numerical increase in certainty, for example ‘up from 90% in 2007’; 
 references to a qualitative increase in certainty, such as ‘‘extremely likely’ rather than ‘very 
likely’, as the last report in 2007 concluded’; and 
 the inference of being synonymous by collocation, for example: ‘extremely likely (95-100% 
probability)’. 
However, 84 of these 225 articles were duplications that appeared either in another format (such as 
both in a print and online version) or in another publication in the same publishing group, leaving 141 
original news items that made implicit reference to the IPCC’s use of calibrated language. In contrast, 
47 news publications (2.47% of ‘IPCC’ articles) explicitly acknowledged that the terms ‘extremely 
likely’ etc. were used deliberately, that the use of such terms by those involved differed to that of the 
lay person and that the qualitative terms ‘extremely likely’ etc. corresponded to a statistical quantity. 
Thus the explicit references incorporated: 
 references to the IPCC’s definition of terms, such as ‘In the IPCC's lexicon, ‘extremely likely’ 
equates to 95 per cent certainty’; 
 references to the use of specific terms, though not specifically identified to be those of the 
IPCC authors, such as, ‘‘extremely likely’, a term meaning it was 95-percent convinced’; and 
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 acknowledgement that the use of such terms differs to that of the lay person: ‘There's a 
mismatch between what scientists say about how certain they are and what the general public 
thinks the experts mean, specialists say’. 
Seventeen of these articles were duplicates of those that had already appeared elsewhere, leaving 30 
(1.57% ‘IPCC’ articles) original news items that made explicit reference to the IPCC’s use of 
calibrated language. This is summarized in Table 1. 
 
Table 1 News items referring to IPCC’s ‘calibrated language’ 
 
 
Among the 923 news items that used ‘certainty’ terms as listed above (certain/uncertain/likely etc.) in 
relation to the IPCC, the term ‘likely’ appeared 1649 times, preceded by ‘extremely’ 449 times and by 
‘very’ 288 times. For the most part (374 of 449 instances, 83.3%), the use of ‘extremely likely’ 
appeared in quotation marks and in a further 59 instances (13.1%), ‘extremely likely’ was presented 
as the words of the report, of the IPCC, or of scientists in general. There were sixteen instances 
(3.6%) in which the journalists reported the findings of AR5 as ‘extremely likely’ but with no indication 
that this was a term that was used deliberately and with an associated statistical value. Furthermore, 
although the use of quotation marks indicated that the use of the terms was by someone other than 
the journalist, this did not indicate the use of a calibrated language. Thus the readers were given little 
to no indication that when the authors used these terms they had a specific statistical value in mind. 
The prevalence of other ‘certainty’ terms in the data is indicated by the values in Table 2. 
 
Table 2 Instances of the use of 'certainty' terms 
 
21-Sep 22-Sep 23-Sep 24-Sep 25-Sep 26-Sep 27-Sep 28-Sep 29-Sep 30-Sep 01-Oct 02-Oct 03-Oct 04-Oct Total
Original "IPCC" search 40 44 106 113 91 114 464 264 70 149 127 120 123 81 1906
with "certainty" terms 30 32 65 69 62 76 331 214 54 97 93 78 83 46 1330
Removed as irrelevant 14 12 28 29 30 35 54 41 16 33 21 31 36 27 407
"IPCC" and "certainty" 16 20 37 40 32 41 277 173 38 64 72 47 47 19 923
Calibrated language
Implicit reference 4 9 8 11 5 6 62 63 8 11 13 12 8 5 225
Quantitative increase 2 3 4 7 4 4 30 40 2 10 8 7 5 2 128
Qualitative increase 1 6 0 1 1 0 7 3 1 1 0 0 0 0 21
Coterminous collocation 0 0 0 0 0 0 37 28 2 3 3 7 2 3 85
Non-dupl icate articles 4 6 6 7 5 7 39 33 4 7 6 8 5 4 141
Explicit reference 0 0 0 4 [2] 4 [2] 7 [5] 13 [11] 9 [3] 1 [1] 2 [2] 1 [1] 2 [1] 3 [1] 1 [1] 47 [30]
IPCC defini tion 0 0 0 3 [1] 3 [0] 3 [2] 8 [7] 7 [2] 1 [1] 2 [1] 1 [1] 2 [1] 3 [1] 0 33 [17]
Non-IPCC defini tion 0 0 0 0 1 [1] 5 [3] 5 [3] 3 [1] 0 0 0 0 0 0 14 [8]
Cites  'mismatch' in terms 0 0 0 3 [2] 2 [0] 0 0 1 [0] 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 [2]
* Numbers in square brackets refer to non-duplicate articles
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In addition to the reported claim by the IPCC authors that it is ‘extremely likely that human influence is 
the dominant cause of the observed warming since the mid-20th century’ many news items quoted the 
use of the term ‘unequivocal’ in the IPCC press release 
(https://www.ipcc.ch/news_and_events/docs/ar5/press_release_ar5_wgi_en.pdf). ‘Unequivocal’ 
appeared 147 times across the 923 articles that referenced certainty in relation to the report. The term 
was referenced exclusively as a quotation; either of the press release of the report itself or as part of a 
commenter’s paraphrasing of the report, such as by Adriana Mugnatto-Hamu, Climate Change Critic 
for the Green Party of Canada (http://www.greenparty.ca/media-release/2013-09-27/world-s-leading-
scientific-climate-body-confirms-99-100-certainty-human-cau). This was not a term that formed part of 
the calibrated language of the IPCC authors but perhaps was preferred for being synonymous with 
‘certainty’, for leaving no doubt. There was a tendency to substitute the word ‘certainty’ for ‘sure’; 135 
instances of ‘sure’ were observed in the 923 articles this was often treated synonymously with 
‘certain’. In 84 of those instances (62.2%) the word ‘sure’ was preceded by a percentage (66%, 90%, 
95%, 100%) corresponding to those levels identified in the calibrated language of AR5: ‘In 2007 they 
were 90% sure, and now they are 95% sure’. Much like ‘certain’, ‘sure’ often appeared in the phrasal 
construct ‘as sure as’, occurring 23 times in the 923 articles (‘as certain as’ appeared 17 times). This 
is necessarily a comparative construct and generally preceded some form of analogy such as ‘as sure 
as scientists are that smoking causes cancer’. Given that the difference between ‘sure’ and ‘certain’ is 
not a matter of technical vocabulary and is unlikely to be preferred as a matter of literacy, we can 
speculate that this indicates that journalists might be more comfortable using ‘sure’ when discussing a 
gradated form of certainty as opposed to a more binary use of ‘certain’ and ‘not certain’. Though 
journalists may feel that the term is synonymous this does not reflect the IPCC authors’ aims of using 
likely 1649 certain 629 certainty 518 confidence 438 certainly 88
extremely -- 449 95% -- 178 95% -- 147 high -- 73 confident 42
i t i s  extremely -- 229 medium -- 29 consensus 79
very -- 288 more -- 165 greater -- 40 low -- 11 likelihood 83
more -- than ever 97 more -- 35 uncertainty 206
more -- 51 virtual ly -- 78 increased -- 14 95% -- 33 uncertainties 123
most -- 24 unlikely 90
as  -- 17 near -- 12 increased -- 19
is  -- 269 virtual  -- 10 greater -- 13
are -- 101 increas ing -- 6
was  -- 66 scienti fic -- 24
wi l l  -- 45
were -- 27
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a consistent form of language when discussing their findings and therefore undermines their attempts 
to perpetuate a calibrated language. 
There were 449 instances of ‘extremely likely’ across 923 news items but references to 
‘certainty’ terms were likely to appear clustered into the same news piece, as with the Climate News 
Network’s thorough explanation (http://www.rtcc.org/2013/09/30/un-climate-report-what-are-the-ipccs-
main-messages/). Of those 46 (29 non-duplicate) news items that made explicit reference to the 
IPCC’s use of a calibrated language, 33 (71.7%) contained little more than a single line definition of 
‘extremely likely’ and/or ‘very likely’ with the corresponding percentage. In two cases scientists were 
quoted explaining the IPCC’s approach to a calibrated system of language. The first case came in the 
form of a transcript of a CNN news broadcast on 28th September 2013 
(http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/1309/28/cnr.01.html) in which guest Michael 
Oppenheimer, Director of Princeton University’s Science program and long-standing IPCC author, is 
quoted as saying, ‘This isn't politics. This is scientific calibration.’ Similarly, in a blog article published 
on the 4th October 2013 by Responding to Climate Change, Peter Stott, who leads the Climate 
Monitoring and Attribution team at the Met Office Hadley Centre and who was a lead author of AR5 
was quoted as saying: 
 
We have very importantly and very carefully calibrated that system [used in AR5] against 
previous assessments. We deliberately took the lead in the fourth assessment report to do 
the same type of analysis and of course use the same type of calibrated language, use the 
same kind of robust and rigorous approach, in order to compare our assessments. 
(http://www.rtcc.org/2013/10/04/ipccs-growing-confidence-is-not-a-question-of-grade-
inflation/). 
 
Responding to Climate Change is accredited as ‘official observers to the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and run a TV studio for the UN at its climate, biodiversity 
and desertification talks’ (http://www.rtcc.org/about-us/) and so we would anticipate a greater level of 
detail in relation to the IPCC reports. There were no other mentions of ‘calibration’/‘calibrated 
language’ across the 923 articles. 
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 One letter appearing in The Telegraph demonstrated how the reported figure – and the 
concepts of ‘confidence’ and ‘consensus’ – could be misunderstood, writing: 
 
SIR - So the IPCC is 95 per cent certain that mankind has been the main cause of climate 
change. Do they simply mean that 19 out of every 20 of their scientists agree? 
(http://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/letters/10345159/George-Osbornes-dole-scheme-will-
help-instil-a-work-ethic-in-jobseekers.html) 
 
This demonstrated that even with a dual numerical and verbal scale the findings were still open to 
misinterpretation. There will inevitably be different levels of scientific and mathematical literacy in the 
public and so journalists, scientists and politicians are charged with the task of communicating at 
these multiple levels of understanding. Perhaps anticipating this, there were instances where 
journalists would supplement the reported findings of AR5 with an analogy. 
 
Table 3 Types of analogy used in relation to the 'certainty' of the findings of AR5 
 
 
 
Use of analogy to make sense of the findings of AR5 
21-Sep 22-Sep 23-Sep 24-Sep 25-Sep 26-Sep 27-Sep 28-Sep 29-Sep 30-Sep 01-Oct 02-Oct 03-Oct 04-Oct Total
Implicit reference 4 9 8 11 5 6 62 63 8 11 13 12 8 5 225
Analogies 1 [1] 0 2 [2] 2 [2] 0 2 [1] 6 [5] 6 [4] 4 [1] 2 [1] 4 [2] 0 2 [2] 0 31 [21]
cigarettes/smoking harmful 0 0 0 1 [1] 0 0 4 [4] 4 [2] 1 [1] 2 [1] 1 [0] 0 1 [1] 0 14 [10]
Doctor diagnoses illness 0 0 0 0 0 2 [1] 1 [1] 1 [0] 2 [0] 0 1 [1] 0 0 0 7 [3]
insurance 0 0 0 1 [1] 0 0 2 [1] 1 [1] 1 [0] 0 1 [1] 0 0 0 6 [4]
rain 0 0 0 0 0 2 [1] 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 [1]
95% = 19/20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 [1] 0 0 0 2 [1]
business 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 [1] 0 1 [1]
central heating 1 [1] 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 [1]
pesticide 0 0 1 [1] 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 [1]
Elvis is alive 0 0 1 [1] 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 [1]
Explicit reference 0 0 0 4 [2] 4 [2] 7 [5] 13 [11] 9 [3] 1 [1] 2 [2] 1 [1] 2 [1] 3 [1] 0 46 [29]
Analogies 0 0 0 3 [1] 2 [0] 2 [2] 2 [2] 2 [1] 0 0 0 0 0 0 11 [6]
cigarettes/smoking harmful 0 0 0 3 [1] 2 [0] 1 [1] 0 1 [0] 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 [2]
getting on a plane 0 0 0 3 [1] 2 [0] 1 [1] 0 1 [0] 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 [2]
vitamins 0 0 0 3 [1] 2 [0] 1 [1] 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 [2]
insurance 0 0 0 3 [1] 2 [0] 0 0 1 [0] 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 [1]
age of Earth 0 0 0 3 [1] 2 [0] 0 0 1 [0] 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 [1]
the sun coming up 0 0 0 3 [1] 2 [0] 0 0 1 [0] 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 [1]
gravity 0 0 0 3 [1] 2 [0] 0 0 1 [0] 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 [1]
age of Universe 0 0 0 3 [1] 2 [0] 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 [1]
rain 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 [1] 1 [1] 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 [2]
gambling 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 [1] 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 [1]
* Numbers in square brackets refer to non-duplicate articles
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There were 42 news items that contained an analogy used in reference to the findings of AR5, though 
only 27 of these were non-duplicates (see Table 3). Those news items that contained ‘explicit’ (as 
opposed to ‘implicit’) references to the calibrated language of the IPCC were more likely to also 
include an analogy. The most common comparison of the certainty of the findings of AR5 was to the 
harmful effects of cigarettes, accounting for exactly half of the analogies in the data. Though all the 
analogies reported here were used in reference to the IPCC assessment report, they referred to 
different aspects: be it the question of (un)certainty; the value of the opinion of those who contributed 
to the report; or the idea of acting despite uncertainty. The relevance of the analogy was generally 
transparent but we must also consider the implications of the analogy that could potentially obfuscate 
meaning. 
 In a news item published three days before the report (http://bigstory.ap.org/article/what-95-
certainty-warming-means-scientists) one author incorporated multiple science-based comparisons to 
convey the 95% degree of certainty reported by the IPCC. After stating that scientists are not 100% 
but 95% certain about the threat of anthropogenic climate change the author cites a number of 
scientists to demonstrate that, in the words of epidemiologist Thomas Burke, ‘[u]ncertainty is inherent 
in every scientific judgment’. The comparisons provided were as follows: 
 
- Top scientists from a variety of fields say they are about as certain that global warming is a 
real, man-made threat as they are that cigarettes kill. 
- They are as sure about climate change as they are about the age of the universe.  
- They say they are more certain about climate change than they are that vitamins make you 
healthy. 
 
Before quoting the following scientists:  
 
- Johns Hopkins University epidemiologist Thomas Burke: ‘Will the sun rise in the morning? 
Scientists know the answer is yes, but they can't really say so with 100-per-cent certainty 
because there are so many factors that are not quite understood or under control.’ 
- Climate change ‘is not as sure as if you drop a stone it will hit the Earth,’ said Princeton 
University climate scientist Michael Oppenheimer. ‘It's not certain, but it's close.’ 
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- Arizona State University physicist Lawrence Krauss said the 95 per cent quoted for climate 
change is equivalent to the current certainty among physicists that the universe is 13.8 billion 
years old. 
- The president of the prestigious National Academy of Sciences, Ralph Cicerone, and more 
than a dozen other scientists said the 95-per-cent certainty regarding climate change is most 
similar to the confidence scientists have in the decades' worth of evidence that cigarettes are 
deadly. 
 
The findings of AR5 were compared with arguably more commonly accepted scientific principles. This 
is useful in characterizing science as a discipline in which uncertainty is ubiquitous, but tolerable. In 
introducing and quoting scientists directly, the author adds validity to the analogies in that they come 
from people working in the discipline, alluding to a factual correctness. Furthermore, there is an 
inference of neutrality here in that these are not the assertions of the journalist themselves.   
The role of scientists as a voice of authority was emphasised in the following two examples, 
which appeared in letters to the respective publications: 
 
Nobody likes bad news, but if 97 mechanics say my car is overheating because it has been 
mistreated and three others -- plus the butcher, the baker and the candlestick maker -- say it's 
just a glitch and it'll fix itself, who should I listen to? 
(http://www.theaustralian.com.au/opinion/letters/a-welcome-call-for-an-open-debate-on-
climate-change/story-fn558imw-1226724689999). 
 
If one of my daughters was gravely ill, and 95 per cent of surgeons said she needed urgent 
surgery, and the other 5 per cent were convinced she didn't, I certainly wouldn't be going to 
shock jocks or politicians for their opinion. 
(Michael Sydney Jones, Hobart Mercury (Australia), 4th October 2013). 
 
Scientists are seen as professionals who have technical expertise and, by likening them to mechanics 
and surgeons, the users of these analogies position scientists as people from whom the general 
public might accept advice. The analogy of the car mechanic allows the individual to refer to both 
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‘overheating’ and ‘mistreatment’ in comparison to the global climate, to give greater detail to their 
comparison. Both examples however, demonstrate a misunderstanding of what the ‘95%’ represents 
and confuse confidence with consensus. In their understanding, there are competing voices who are 
not seen to be qualified or equipped to offer advice but who do so anyway and they are seen as the 
obstacle to achieving ‘100%’. In this respect the analogies are incongruous with the report and create 
a pejorative representation of those believed to represent the imagined 5% (or 3%). These individuals 
are written off as ‘shock jocks’ and as figures of a nursery rhyme (‘The butcher, the baker, the 
candlestick maker’). Another form of ridicule came from former Prime Minister Tony Blair, who was 
quoted as saying: 
 
‘Ninety-five per cent certain is a pretty large degree of certainty - I recall that the number of 
people who think Elvis is still alive is round about five per cent,’ he added, to laughter. 
 (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/northamerica/usa/10329520/No-serious-
person-should-doubt-man-behind-climate-change-says-Tony-Blair.html). 
 
This analogy draws upon a number of elements built around the mythology of Elvis Presley, who has 
been described as being an extra-terrestrial being and whose supposed ‘death’ was part of a 
government conspiracy; neither of which has been treated as having real credibility. Despite another 
misrepresentation of confidence as consensus, the effect of this is to undermine the significance of 
5% uncertainty which in this exchange became laughable. 
 
The EU's Commissioner for Climate Action, Connie Hedegaard was quoted as saying: 
What would you do if your doctor was 95 per cent sure you had a serious illness? Whose side 
are you on? Those who want to act on 95 per cent certainty or those who gamble on the 
remaining 5 per cent?  
(http://www.nzherald.co.nz/world/news/article.cfm?c_id=2&objectid=11132042). 
 
IPCC lead author Professor Steve Sherwood was quoted as making a similar analogy: 
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if the diagnosis is the patient is going to die, but there is some uncertainty on exactly when, 
you do not just throw out the initial diagnosis of death. 
(http://newsstore.fairfax.com.au/apps/viewDocument.ac;jsessionid=F9FE41E5B03B3CBA71B
9C3BB928E84EF?sy=afr&pb=all_ffx&dt=selectRange&dr=1month&so=relevance&sf=text&sf
=headline&rc=10&rm=200&sp=brs&cls=1463&clsPage=1&docID=SHD130922265H26995CH
). 
There is some merit in characterising the planet as a living human being, in so far as complex 
biological processes can be compared to complex climatic processes. In this context one can 
compare unnatural levels of carbon emissions to the over-production of cells associated with cancer, 
for example. But in the first example the issue is presented as an either-or scenario when in fact, 
there are multiple courses of action that could be taken in relation to climate change. Thus, even if we 
‘side’ with the scenario about which scientists are 95% certain this does not provide us with an idea of 
what to do. When commentators discussed taking action despite uncertainty, there was a greater 
consideration of ‘risk’. A somewhat mundane example came from J. Marshall Shepherd, President of 
the American Meteorological Society: ‘most people would grab an umbrella if you said there was a 95 
percent chance of rain’ (http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/1309/28/cnr.01.html). Another 
publication quoting Climate Change Commissioner Connie Hedegaard wrote: 
 
If your doctor was 95% sure you had a serious disease, you would immediately start looking 
for the cure. Why should we take bigger risks when the health of our planet is at stake? 
 (http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-13-827_en.htm). 
 
In quoting some anonymous ‘risk experts’, a newswire author made the following analogy: 
 
After all, most people wouldn't get on a plane that had only a 95-per-cent certainty of landing 
safely, risk experts say. 
(http://bigstory.ap.org/article/what-95-certainty-warming-means-scientists). 
 
Prime Minister David Cameron and the David Suzuki Foundation science and policy manager Ian 
Bruce were quoted as using analogies that referred to the act of buying insurance as a precaution 
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against one’s house burning down (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/david-
cameron/10341422/David-Cameron-a-Prime-Minister-in-a-hurry.html; 
http://www.davidsuzuki.org/media/news/2013/09/david-suzuki-foundation-calls-on-canadians-to-
support-climate-action-in-response/). As early as 2006 climate scientists were exhorted to use the 
home insurance analogy when communicating the risks of global warming to policy makers 
(Schwartz, 2006). Painter (2013) has advocated the ‘insurance’ analogy since it represents an 
everyday consideration of risk that most people can relate to. In an interview he pointed out that ‘More 
risk language helps to shift the public debate away from the idea that decisions should be delayed 
until absolute certainty is obtained - something that may never be achieved.’ 
(http://www.politics.ox.ac.uk/index.php/news/james-painter-on-climate-change-as-risk.html). However, 
there is much more of an individualistic emphasis in these analogies and it is much more 
straightforward for people to make decisions about their own actions in relation to risks to themselves. 
As far as individual agency is concerned, we cannot suitably compare the threat of a terminal illness 
to the unforeseen consequences of climate change at an individual level. The analogies in the 
examples above are chosen to demonstrate that 100% certainty is not required in order for us to 
accept the reality of certain phenomena and convey a more ‘risk’-oriented discourse in which we have 
some expectation of what the outcomes could be. 
 
Discussion  
In assessing the suitability and efficacy of the analogies reported here, we can refer back to Kueffer 
and Larson’s (2014) criteria for the use of metaphorical language in science communication: factual 
correctness; socially acceptable language; neutrality; and transparency. The analogies were identified 
by their explicit construction and as such, could be defined by their transparency. Their function as a 
form of metaphorical language is arguably unequivocal, but there are questions about their factual 
correctness and neutrality. Perhaps the most prevalent incongruence of the analogies reported here 
is the over-emphasis on individual risk and individual consequences for the incitement to individual 
action. 
Researchers have suggested that the IPCC reports should be discussed in terms of risk, 
rather than uncertainty (Pidgeon & Fischhoff, 2011; Pidgeon, 2012; Painter, 2013). Uncertainty is 
associated with passivity and the precautionary principle; risk implies to some extent that the outcome 
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is foreseeable and somewhat predictable and as such, we can make decisions on how to act 
(Heyman, 2010). Adopting a discourse of risk is seen to have greater potential for public 
understanding since ‘risk is an essential part of everyday experience’ (Painter, 2013: vii) and 
insurance, betting/investment and healthcare are seen to be everyday examples of where such risks 
are assumed to be well understood by the general public.  
However the implications of buying insurance, for example, are largely incongruous with the 
threat of climate change. The uncertainty the IPCC deals with is the Knightian uncertainty (under 
which the exact probabilities of future events are not known). Such a notion cannot be accurately 
captured by the insurance analogy, as an insurance normally presumes known probabilities of future 
outcomes. The term itself ‘insurance’ denotes an agreement that somebody will indemnify the holder 
in the event of the specified catastrophe. By contrast, scientists and policymakers propose mitigation, 
which is more akin to ‘fireproofing’ than fire insurance. Thus, despite its aptness in demonstrating how 
people take action on low probability/high impact events, the added implication of compensation 
makes the insurance analogy unsuitable as a comparison to the threat of anthropogenic climate 
change and actions that might be taken to deal with it. Another problem associated with the use of 
this analogy lies in the fact that we are not often made aware of the ‘successes’ of mitigation. That is 
to say, when a natural disaster strikes, we rarely acknowledge the thousands of lives saved by the 
implementation of precautionary measures, as we understandably focus much more on the lives lost 
and the damage done. As such, the benefits of such precautionary measures are not fully recognised. 
Most people have some awareness or experience of the rewards of an insurance policy and can 
therefore appreciate the value in investing in one. Similarly, most people will have experience some 
treatment of an illness and can relate to analogies that refer to the healthcare domain. But this again 
is a much more personal experience and one that carries with it highly emotive inferences in 
prompting individuals to consider their own mortality. That is not to say that likening this threat to the 
threat of climate change to the planet is inappropriate, but we must be conscious of a loss in neutrality 
when comparisons with such highly emotive issues are made. It has been argued that affect-based 
decisions about climate change are not only unlikely to motivate significant action but may also have 
unintended negative effects if they are perceived as ‘scare tactics’ (Weber, 2010). 
 The expectation that some members of the public would struggle to comprehend the scientific 
understanding of ‘uncertainty’ through concepts of confidence and consensus was evident in the data. 
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Readers were shown to misunderstand ‘95% certainty’ as a 19-out-of-20 consensus and former Prime 
Minister Tony Blair used the terms interchangeably. We can expect that a disparity in the scientific 
literacy of the public will endure, but this does emphasise the need for scientists and politicians to 
communicate in response to different levels of understanding, particularly given the subjectivity of 
‘meaning’. Journalists themselves did not venture to reinterpret the figures themselves (whether this 
was a question of understanding or authority) but consistently quoted others – primarily scientists – to 
translate the findings of AR5. If not as ‘translators’ however, journalists do play a significant role in 
selecting which commentators are referenced in order to provide some clarification of the science. 
Thus it was predominantly scientists themselves who were providing metaphorical interpretations of 
the data (see also Nerlich and Halliday, 2007). But it was unclear in what context they were provided 
and for whom.  
Having identified the need for a variety of communication strategies in light of disparate levels 
of understanding, the scientists who engage with the public – via the media or otherwise – must 
consider an appropriate strategy based on their presumed audience which includes weighing up the 
use of calibrated or analogy-based language. The scientists quoted in the data may have been 
selected because they were the ones to make public statements but in the context of the articles they 
are employed as an authority; as having expert knowledge on the subject and therefore as someone 
who has the understanding to translate scientific findings and whose opinion ‘matters’. This effect was 
shown in the data by readers who commented upon the value of the opinions of scientists, rather than 
‘the butcher, the baker and the candlestick maker’. 
 
Conclusion 
A recent study examining the IPCC’s calibrated language comes to the conclusion that ‘[t]hrough the 
publication of probabilistic statements about climate risks and impacts, the IPCC has had a powerful 
influence on the concept of climate change in public and media discourses [...] It is essential, 
therefore, to understand how the information that the IPCC conveys is understood by members of the 
public’. This would indicate a ‘win’ for the IPCC as a primary ‘validator of scientific information’ (see 
Gamson, 1999; Carvalho, 2007). Our analysis has shown a less powerful influence of the IPCC over 
media discourses and therefore a less powerful influence, perhaps, on public and policy perceptions 
of climate change and less influence on political decision making. The English speaking news media 
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we surveyed both quantitatively and qualitatively show some awareness of the IPCC’s calibrated 
language but prefer to use a type of framing of uncertainty through, sometimes flawed, analogies. 
Such metaphorical framing is widespread not only in journalistic discourse but also in political and 
scientific discourse. It is almost the only type of language that all the spheres involved in the cultural 
circuits of climate change have in common: science, politics and publics. They are the go-to 
messengers of meaning in science communication (Maasen & Weingart, 1995) and the IPCC might 
therefore want to reflect on their use and abuse in the future when recalibrating their communication 
efforts. 
The authors of the IPCC Assessment Reports have recognised the need for clarification when 
it comes to discussing scientific uncertainty in relation to the threat of anthropogenic climate change 
and a calibrated language system has been developed in order to standardise conditions of certainty 
and likelihood. This has provided a context in which to understand the claim that it is ‘extremely likely’   
that human activity is responsible for changes in the climate, a context to convey the confidence in 
this claim and a context which was largely absent in the media reports of AR5. Only 14.27% of news 
items made reference (11.80% ‘implicit’ and 2.47% ‘explicit’) to the IPCC’s use of calibrated language 
in reference to (un)certainty. This is comparable to Painter’s (2013) reported finding of 15% of news 
articles explaining the meaning of ‘confidence’ and ‘likelihood’ in relation to previous IPCC reports. 
Instead of this semantic context, journalists often quoted scientists and other public figures 
who had offered metaphorical and comparative explanations of the strength of the findings of AR5, 
referring to the discourse of medicine, of insurance and to other well-established scientific claims. 
Analogy was often used to demonstrate that the public is familiar with and accepting of scientific 
claims despite uncertainty and that scientists, politicians and members of the public all take action 
despite uncertainty. In this respect, the analogy of buying insurance was often referred to and 
introduced more risk-oriented concepts. 
 However, some attempts at reinterpreting AR5’s ‘headline’ finding demonstrated that there is 
potential for misunderstanding in translating the claim of ‘extremely likely’ and its associated ‘95% 
certainty’, such as the confusion between ‘certainty’ and ‘consensus’. We have also commented on 
the potential for misapprehension in the use of metaphorical language, where the appropriation of a 
more familiar concept introduces dimensions that are incongruous with the original claim, such as the 
compensatory dimension of the insurance analogy. The greatest challenge for science 
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communication and public understanding of climate science may be in relating anthropogenic climate 
change as a global concept to the decisions and behaviours of individuals. In this article we found that 
this is exactly where the greatest incongruity lay in the analogies found in the data. 
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